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Abstract 
 
 The politics of Blacks are stereotypically assumed to be the same and share the 
same race-based root, be it disenfranchisement or solidarity. Given the recent jump in 
Black political participation and the seemingly race-based and partisan nature “the Black 
vote” holds, it is essential to investigate what factors drive Black voter turnout as well as 
what factors contribute to the partisan nature of Black voters. Most other studies of 
political opinion, turnout, and party preference only consider comparable demographic 
groups such as men versus women or Blacks versus Whites. This study examines partisan 
preference and participation only among Black Americans. The data used here come 
from the American National Election Survey (ANES) 1984, 1996, and 2008 Pre- and 
Post-Election Survey, election years that coincided with peaks and lows of Black voter 
turnout since the Civil Rights Movement. Findings indicate that Black Democrats report 
higher voter turnout than Black non-Democrats, and younger Blacks and those who 
opposed abortion were less likely to vote. Also, results suggest that although Black 
partisanship can be predicted by gender, abortion stance, and age, partisanship is largely 
not a product of demographics or political stances based on how little variance these 
models account; rather, Black partisanship may be explained by aspects that go beyond 
these usual determinants, measures, and proxies. Implications of this study show that 
non-Democratic Blacks were political available to other parties, and it warrants a further 
investigation into Black partisanship.
1 
 
 
 
Chapter 1:  
Introduction 
 
 The politics of Blacks are stereotypically assumed to be the same and share the 
same race-based root. First, Black voters have been largely underrepresented in political 
participation, a trend usually reduced to racial disenfranchisement (Diemer and Li 2011; 
Ochs 2006; Uggen, Behrens, and Manza 2005; Clayton 2004; Uggen and Manza 2002). 
Recently, Black voter turnout has been on the rise. The Presidential election of 2012 
surprised many pundits as Black turnout mirrored the overwhelming figures from 2008 as 
Blacks returned with massive support for Democratic President Barack Obama (SSDAN 
2012; Taylor 2012). The elections of 2008 and 2012 were the first elections in which 
Blacks were overrepresented at the polls when compared to Whites and the national 
average (Taylor 2012).  
 Second, Black voters lean overwhelmingly toward Democratic Party candidates in 
local, state, and federal elections, a phenomenon attributed to race (Gerber 1996). While 
many Republicans readily tag themselves as the “Party of Lincoln” to harken the 
abolitionist president, a partisan shift in racial ideology followed the presidency of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt. The New Deal coalition and its Democratic Party began to take a 
stand against racial injustice along with various other social ills (Harris-Lacewell 2003; 
Wielhouwer 2000), and later Democrats continued to advocate for racial equality through 
the 1960s until now (Whitby 2002), signaling a turning point in voting behavior and party 
identification among Blacks (Luks and Elms 2005). This pattern has been so consistent 
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that Black voter solidarity has become known as “the Black vote.” Despite this strong 
allegiance, few scholars have pointed out that Blacks differ from the Democratic platform 
on social issues such as abortion, same-sex marriage, and all forms of government 
welfare (Clawson and Clark 2003; Harris-Lacewell 2003; Bovasso 1993). 
 Because of the consistency in the political direction of “the Black vote” and the 
racially-based presumption of its political presence and force, actual Black voter turnout 
and partisanship remain mostly assumed and understudied. Table 1.1 demonstrates that 
despite the assumed allegiance of Blacks with the Democratic Party via national 
Democratic candidates, a significant number of Blacks are not Democrats. Given the 
recent jump in Black political participation and the seemingly partisan nature “the Black 
vote” holds, it is essential to investigate what factors drive Black voter turnout as well as 
what factors contribute to the partisan nature of Black voters. These trends suggest that in 
the future, Black voters may have more power to influence the direction and shape of 
American politics. 
 To grasp a more complete understanding of the factors that influence Black 
political participation and political behavior, three distinct Presidential election periods 
were chosen. Table 1.1 also provides evidence of the federal voting pattern among Blacks 
in the Presidential elections of 1984, 1996, and 2008. Census data from the Social 
Sciences Data Analysis Network (SSDAN) indicates that these three target years were 
milestones as far as Black political participation. The 1984 election was the highest level 
of Black voter turnout since the Civil Rights Movement; the 1996 election held the 
lowest rate of post-Civil Rights Black voter turnout. Black voter turnout hit a new post-
Civil Rights peak in 2008 with voter turnout among Blacks eclipsing that of Whites and 
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the national average for the first time (SSDAN 2012). Note that 1984 and 1996 Black 
turnout patterns of SSDAN (2012) are not clearly reflected in Table 1.1, probably due to 
the difference in Black sample sizes of SSDAN (who utilizes census data) and ANES 
(see Chapter 3). 
Table 1.1: Turnout Statistics (%) for Black Respondents in ANES 1984, 1996, 2008 
 1984 1996 2008 
Voter Turnout    
Voted 65.6 67.8 81.5 
Did not vote 34.4 32.2 18.5 
Vote for President     
Rep. candidate 9.1 0.9 0.5 
Dem. candidate 88.6 96.3 99.3 
Other candidate 2.3 2.8 0.2 
Party Identification    
Democrat 63.6 65.7 71.1 
Republican 3.6 3.4 1.9 
Independent 21.5 22.2 22.4 
Other/No Pref. 11.3 8.7 4.5 
Voter Turnout by 
Party 
   
Democrat 76.9 75.2 88.9 
Non-Democrat 46.3 53.4 64.6 
 
 This study investigates both voter turnout (political participation) and party 
preference (political behavior) of Black Americans of the Reagan Era to the election of 
the first Black president in order to debunk stereotypes placed on Black voters. Research 
examines the influence of party affiliation on voting and factors related to party 
affiliation among whites or all voters, but little research examines these factors among 
minority voting blocs such as Blacks. This study is an analysis of gaps in American 
political participation and behavior that usually occur along demographic lines that many 
scholars believe influence our political system as well as our understanding of American 
politics such as socioeconomics, education, age, sex, and region characteristics (Fisher 
2011; Fhagen-Smith, Vandiver, Worrell and Cross, 2010; Luks and Elms 2005). Most 
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other studies of political opinion, turnout, and party preference only consider comparable 
demographic groups such as men versus women or Blacks versus Whites. This study 
examines political preference and participation only among Black Americans in order to 
emphasize in-group variations by gender, age, and region as well as political ideology. It 
also focuses on Black Democrats versus Black non-Democrat voters instead of Black 
Republicans, because there is a sizable Black Independent or unaffiliated population. 
 
Figure 1.1: ANES Black Voter Turnout (%) by Party Affiliation 1976-2008 
 The first set of analyses in Chapter 4.1 examines factors that drive voter turnout 
among Blacks. Findings in Chapter 4.1 mirror Table 1.1 evidence that Black Democrats 
report higher voter turnout than Black non-Democrats. Figure 1.1 highlights the disparity 
within Black voter turnout in presidential elections since 1976, and Black Democrats 
appear to vote more than Black Republicans and Independents (non-Democrats). This 
trend may have begun after 1960, and Black non-Democrats’ turnout converged with 
turnout levels of Black Democrats in the 1976 election. The American National Election 
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Survey (ANES) data for election years prior to 1976 were problematic with a significant 
number of Black responses missing for turnout and political-based question. (Such a time 
in American history may not have been as conducive for Black respondents to answer 
phone callers’ inquiries about voting and candidate preference.) The 1980 election 
witnessed the sharp decline in Black non-Democrat voting, but it was slowly returning to 
Democrat turnout levels after the Reagan Era, that is until 2008 when Black Democrats’ 
voting escalated. This discovery justifies an in-depth look into Black voter turnout. 
Figure 1.2: ANES Black Democratic Party Affiliation (%) 1976-2008 
 Chapter 4.2 focuses on factors that inform Black partisanship. Chapter 4.2 
findings suggest that although Black partisanship can be predicted by gender, abortion 
stance, and age, partisanship is largely not a product of demographics or political stances 
based on how little variance these models account; rather, Black partisanship may be 
explained by aspects that go beyond these usual determinants, measures, and proxies. 
Figure 1.2 shows the shifts in Black partisanship via Democratic Party affiliation in 
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presidential elections since 1976. Luks and Elms (2005) describe a slow trend of fewer 
Blacks identifying as Democrats since the early 1970s as more political rights were 
gained. Perhaps this partisan migration away from Democrats has slowed or even 
reversed with the subsequent election of Barack Obama as President because of 
descriptive representation, defined as having a candidate that have/has the same 
demographic(s) (here being Black). Even so, the past “defections” do not necessarily 
equal a rise in Black Republicans; most of the non-Democratic Blacks are Independent 
(Luks and Elms 2005). The research question is what factors are related to Black voter 
resistance to Democratic affiliation while the majority of the racial group aligns itself 
with Democrats? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
Chapter 2:  
Literature Review 
 
 Scholarship, media, and political tracking organizations like Pew and Gallup 
analyze voter turnout, partisanship, and political opinions along demographic lines to 
illustrate trends, breakdown elections, and describe factors that influence political 
participation (voter turnout). These trends are widely broadcasted and routinely 
examined, but unfortunately, they are only applied to the general American population. 
Little is known about how demographic factors impact the political outcomes of specific 
racial groups. Most studies about political participation and partisanship fail to take into 
account race/ethnicity at all, believing that racial differences disappear after other 
demographic factors are held constant (Timpone 1998). Research that does address race 
simply compares Blacks versus Whites or Latinos versus Whites.  
 By contrast, this study explores how demographics and political stances impact 
political participation and political behavior within a specific racial group, Black 
Americans. The following demographic subsections review what is known about the 
impact each has on political participation and partisanship in general. These documented 
patterns in the literature provide a guide to compare how demographics impact Black 
voter turnout and partisanship. 
2.1 Gender 
 Since 1980, women have made up most of the active electorate, and their 
percentage of the overall voter turnout has grown in each election (SSDAN 2012). The 
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political gender gap is a multifaceted relationship with sources rooted in the socialization 
of men and women (Wolak and McDevitt 2011; Matthews,  Hempel, and Howell 2010; 
Fridkin and Kenney 2007; Hooghe and Stolle 2004), men and women’s willingness to 
oppose hierarchy and domination (Fridkin and Kenney 2007), ideological gender 
differences (Burrell 2005), gendered differences in the awareness of and attraction to 
politics (Ondercin and Jones-White 2011; Wolak and McDevitt 2011; Brooks 2010; 
Gordon 2008; Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997), and gendered differences in 
economic vulnerability (Manza and Brooks 1998). Also, attitudinal characteristics and 
demographics affect voter turnout differently for men and women (Coffe and Bolzendahl 
2010). 
 Unfortunately, few studies of women’s voting patterns consider voting patterns 
and trends in political thought among minority women. Cole and Stewart (1996) believe 
voting differences between Black and White women are due to different meanings 
political participation has for each group. Robnett and Bany (2011) note that church 
involvement fosters an increase of political participation for Black men more so than 
Black women. Overall, the focus on trendy White swing voter groups such as “security 
moms,” “soccer moms,” or “mama grizzlies” limits the persistence of the gendered 
political participation gap, especially when it comes to gender intersectionality and intra-
racial gender differences in political participation and partisanship.  
 When it comes to gender and partisanship, women are more liberal in their 
political orientation when compared to men (Lien 1998; Gay and Tate 1998; Carter, 
Corra, and Carter 2009). Scholars tend to believe race is a stronger bond than gender for 
Black women (Burns and Gallagher 2010; Carter et al 2009; Wilcox 1997). Simien and 
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Clawson (2004) posit that Black women develop Black feminist consciousness—an 
awareness of oppressions and a specific political response to oppressions—that, to an 
extent, spills over to Black men via recognition of the double discrimination faced by 
Black women. For such reasons, gender gaps in political behavior are thought to be 
smaller among Blacks and other non-White groups when compared to Whites, thus 
justifying the all-encompassing notion of “the Black vote” (Fisher 2011; Hardy-Fanta et 
al 2006; Lien 1998).   
 Most studies that include race, gender, and politics focus on racial comparisons or 
only Black female ideology. The political orientation of Black women is often considered 
to be an overlapping of race and gender identities with the assumption that both identities 
should promote a rather liberal political standpoint (Gay and Tate 1998). In regards to 
which identity is more salient, Wilcox (1997) and Gay and Tate (1998) contend that 
Black women view politics through racial lens because “gender is simply a weak vehicle 
for political identification” (Gay and Tate 1998:182). Race is more influential than 
gender in predicting political outcomes as evidenced in descriptive representation where 
Black candidates can mobilize same-race Black voters, but women candidates do not 
provide the same motivation for Black women (Carter et al 2009; Huddy and Carey 2009; 
Reingold and Harrell 2010; McDermott 1998). 
 Conversely, other scholars position the politics of Black women to be divergent 
from other race-gender groups. For Black women, race and gender interact to create 
experiences unique from Black men and non-Black women that determine the attitudes 
and personal realities of Black women about their situation and the surrounding world 
(Carter et al 2009; Philpot and Walton 2007). Kam, Zechmeister, and Wilking (2007) 
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suggest that factors such as opportunities, resources, and motivation impact a gender gap 
in political participation even across ethnic/racial groups.  
 Differing experiences and philosophies between Black women and Black men 
may result in divergent political expressions that have mostly been taken for granted. 
Allison’s (2011) study found that favor for the Iraq War differed between Black men and 
Black women, with Black men’s favor of the war actually not significantly varying from 
White men’s, and Black women were in the strongest opposition out of any group 
measured, showing a more liberal stance in this issue. These results counter previous 
literature that Black support for war and military force is consistently low. Furthermore, 
Allison’s (2011) study demonstrated a gender gap on a political issue was far more 
significant than a race gap which supports Philpot, Shaw, and McGowen’s (2009) notion 
of a growing complexity and heterogeneity in Black political attitudes. 
2.2 Age 
 Research on age effects is sparse and typically generalized for the entire 
American population. Evidence has shown that voter turnout and civic participation 
increases with age and is also considered to be an act of productive aging (Burr, Caro, 
and Moorhead 2002). Younger voters or those of “Generation X” and “Generation Y” 
tend to be more liberal and have lower turnout than older voters. Post-depression born 
Baby Boomers (born between the 1946 and 1964) have the highest turnout. Voters born 
during the Great Depression trend more conservative and have lower turnout than Baby 
Boomers (Lau and Redlawsk 2008; Gimpel, Morris, and Armstrong 2004). Age 
distribution in a region can severely affect turnout and political outlooks (Gimpel et al 
2004).  
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 Diemer and Li (2011) find that youth voting behavior among Black and Latino 
groups is different than White youth and older people. These differences are facilitated by 
critical consciousness and peer and parental sociopolitical support. The voting behavior 
of marginalized youth increases when parents, teachers, and peers foster ideas about the 
youth’s capacity to consider and impact the sociopolitical environment in America; if 
they are critically aware of the social and political worlds, they will probably be 
empowered and inspired to take action (Diemer and Li 2011). 
 It is typically assumed that older voters are more conservative and resistant to 
change than younger populations (Lau and Redlawsk 2008). Strong determinants of 
Black partisanship include age and generation (Luks and Elms 2005). The oldest and 
youngest generational cohorts may actually feel less attachment to the Democratic Party 
when compared to those in the middle because of the varying historical experiences: 
growing up prior to Democrats being known as the party of racial and economic equality 
or growing up in times after the Civil Rights Movement and its aftermath (Luks and Elms 
2005).  
2.3 Education 
 Media and scholars tell us that increases in educational attainment lead to 
increases in voting and political engagement (Straughn and Andriot 2011; Sondheimer 
and Green 2010). Yet greater educational attainment in America has not led to greater 
voter turnout overall. Burden (2009) contends that the relationship between education and 
political participation is dynamic, having more of an effect after the 1980s, and manifests 
value in voting and not political knowledge like being aware of the names of one’s 
senators and representatives (Burden, 2009). Berinsky and Lenz (2011) suggest that 
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education may not actually create larger political participation. Instead, the very psycho-
social factors that influence the choice to actively pursue higher education may also 
influence the choice to vote, although the authors do not list specific factors. 
 Low-income college students are more likely to be politically active and engaged; 
their opportunities, fates, and economic well-being are linked to government activities 
and policies (Ozymy 2012). Diemer and Li (2011) note that marginalized youth’s critical 
and political consciousness may be fostered by education. As such, an education in 
politics can be valued as an education for politics, an idea highlighted by the modern 
controversies involving multicultural education, historical perspectives presented in 
classrooms, and pro-ethnic humanities courses.  
 In general, it is believed that more education leads to more liberal outlooks on 
political as well as social issues, but many authors agree that there are several nuances to 
this relationship. Campbell (2007) shows that high school classroom racial diversity 
actually decreases political discussions in the classroom and subsequently produces a less 
informed and engaged future voters. Within higher education, Elchardus and Spruyt 
(2009) find that while there does exist a small socialization effect, the relationship 
between higher education and political behavior is more selective; those who support 
liberal ideology select liberal fields, for example. While education may have a direct 
relationship with more liberal ideas in politics and race, educated Whites who still 
maintain negative racial perceptions are more likely to apply such views to policy stances 
than less educated Whites who hold the same attitudes (Federico 2005).  
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2.4 Socioeconomic Status 
 While the “haves” usually vote, those at the economic bottom rungs tend to be 
disenfranchised and not be civically or politically active (Levin-Waldman 2013; Rehm 
2010). Lim and Sander (2013) report high levels of income inequality and unemployment 
are correlated with less political participation. On the other hand, authors like Cho and 
Gimpel (2009) call into question the salience of personal economics, especially in times 
of hardship. Referencing the 2008 Presidential Election, Cho and Gimpel (2009) find that 
regardless of any strength and magnitude of the effects of the economic downturn by 
region and community, the political stances of large minority areas and those with strong 
conservative views like in the South were bound to remain the same ideologically. 
 In a study of some of the poorest inner city regions of the country, Lawless and 
Fox (2001) find that some of the same demographic and material factors that influence 
overall voting trends impact political participation such as age, gender, and education. In 
her research on neighborhood conditions and mothers’ political and civic participation, 
Casciano (2007) finds that participation is largely influenced by individual 
characteristics, too, albeit not in the directions expected. “For more advantaged 
mothers—specifically, those with higher education levels or who are married—the odds 
of voting tend to decrease as neighborhood poverty grows; however, for mothers with 
only a high school degree and cohabiting mothers, voting is higher in poor neighborhoods 
than it is in more affluent neighborhoods” (Casciano 2007:1143, emphasis added). 
Additionally, Casciano (2007) finds that the odds of volunteering for political causes 
increase with neighborhood poverty for mothers of color and unmarried mothers, whereas 
neighborhood poverty is unrelated to White and married mothers’ volunteering.  
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 When it comes to income and political behavior, conventional wisdom and years 
of research tells that the “haves” prefer the Republican Party, and the “have-nots” trend 
toward Democrats (Rehm 2010). In his work, Rehm (2010) shows that “the same 
[relationship] is true when it comes to income prospects (risk exposure): the ‘will-haves’ 
tend to be pro-Republican, while the ‘will-have-nots’ tend to favor the Democrats; future 
income– risk exposure– is a powerful factor in shaping individuals’ social policy and 
partisan preferences (just like current income)” (384, emphasis added). This trend may be 
responsible for the rise in strong partisanship as risk inequality continues to grow. Upper-
income Americans have a far less economically risky outlook than those on the bottom 
who face union shrinkage, lagging minimum wage, and declining low-skill/high-paying 
jobs (Rehm 2010). Brewer and Stonecash (2001) find that income is responsible in the 
declining White support for the Democratic Party in the South over the last half century, 
even when ideological positions on race and racism that have historically impacted 
Southern politics are held constant. However, studies show a weak correlation between 
Democratic Party affiliation and socioeconomic status among Blacks (Philpot and Walton 
2007; Luks and Elms 2005). From 1973 to 1994, poor Blacks moved from the most likely 
to the least likely to identify with a major political party (Luks and Elms 2005). 
 Brooks and Brady (1999) agree that income is a significant variable in voter 
alignment, but they also contend that it can be a predictor of political change. Rather than 
the notion of whichever party presides over economic growth periods steers the political 
direction of America, Brooks and Brady (1999) argue that shifts in mean income actually 
determine this relationship: the more income people have, the more conservative their 
political/economic stance becomes. In other words, it has little to do with national growth 
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where stock values and Gross Domestic Product do not necessarily translate into what’s 
actually in people’s pockets. And Levin-Waldman (2013) speculates that a policy to raise 
the wages of the impoverished (vs. the conventional middle-class focus) and reduce 
income inequality would also increase their civic and political participation. 
2.5 Region 
 Typically, region is not a variable considered in studies of voter turnout. Cho and 
Rudolph (2008) did find that community homogeneity—mainly by race and 
socioeconomics—is strongly related to political participation or voting, having a greater 
effect than heterogeneity in either direction. In other words, both the lowest of low and 
highest of high voter turnouts are typically located in same-race/same-income 
communities rather than racially-diverse and/or mixed-income communities. If this 
localized pattern applies to national regions because Blacks are more concentrated 
(homogeneous) in big cities in the Northeast and West instead of being more dispersed 
via towns and neighborhoods like in the South and Midwest, then region may be 
influential in Black voter turnout. 
 American political behavior has long thought to be subject to political 
regionalism, especially in respect to the North, the South, and the West. It is part of the 
basis of the concept of “red states” and “blue states”. Political regionalism posits that “if 
regions are politically exceptional, then individuals sharing the same profile but living in 
divergent regions will vote differently from one another” (Aistrup 2010:924). 
Regionalism plays a role in the small, yet growing, Black political heterogeneity. 
Traditionally, Blacks in the South were more Democratic than Blacks residing in other 
regions of the United States; but in more recent times, Southern Blacks are more likely to 
 
 
16 
 
be Independents than Blacks in other regions (Luks and Elms 2005). Metropolitan and 
urban-dwelling Blacks are less likely to identify as Republicans than those living in small 
towns, suburbs, or rural areas (Luks and Elms 2005).  
 In general, Aistrup (2010) finds that political regionalism seems to be waning 
with the South beginning to mirror the non-South “relative to the influences of race, 
family income, union membership, in-migrants, and gender; and the non-South is 
converging with the South relative to the influences of education, blue-collar workers, 
and age” (906). Traditional notions of regionalism are also being augmented by other 
concepts of location and localism. Cho and Rudolph (2008) conclude that learning, 
creating, sharing, and responding to political ideas do not hinge on the active 
communication with those around us but can be executed through mere observation, a 
point neglected in the literature. 
 Given all that the literature has offered in terms of demographic influences on 
political participation and partisanship, little is known about how these demographic 
factors impact the political outcomes of specific racial groups. Here, this study explores 
voter turnout and partisanship among Black Americans. I use ANES data from 1984, 
1996, and 2008 to explore how the demographic factors outlined in the literature as well 
as political stances impact Black political participation and partisanship. 
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Chapter 3:  
Data and Methods 
 
 This study examines voter turnout and party affiliation among Blacks using data 
from the American National Election Survey (ANES) 1984, 1996, and 2008 Pre- and 
Post-Election Survey. In addition to collecting demographic information, these surveys 
focus on political participation, voter perceptions of Democrats and Republicans, social 
issues, candidates and political figures, and national and international issues (ICPSR 
2012). These surveys were collected starting in the month of September of the respective 
year by random digit sample phone numbers (phone interviews) in the United States. The 
response rate for each survey was around 60%. The three surveys include a total of 1,040 
Black respondents: 250 in 1984, 207 in 1996, and 583 in 2008. The 2008 survey included 
a Black oversample justified by the presence of the first Black general presidential 
election nominee, Barack Obama, on the Democratic ticket. 
 Each set of surveys was completed directly prior to and following the Presidential 
election when conversations of political approval of the President, his party, and the 
Presidential election are in the forefront of the media. Up until that point, the 1984 
election was the highest level of Black voter turnout since the Civil Rights Movement; 
1996 was the lowest rate of post-Civil Rights Black voter turnout. Black voter turnout hit 
a post-Civil Rights peak in 2008 with voter turnout among Blacks eclipsing that of 
Whites and the national average for the first time (SSDAN 2012). These surveys also 
represent periods of very different national, political, and economic situations: 1984 was 
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the Reagan Era; 1996 was the re-election of President Clinton, at the time colloquially 
considered by some to be the “first Black president”; and 2008 featured the economic 
downturn, the financial bailouts, the sharp rise in unemployment, and the burgeoning 
change to more divisive political discourse, as well as the first Black presidential 
nominee. Because they were taken from the same series, each dataset contains 
corresponding questions and coding. This investigation includes different Black 
respondents at different points rather than longitudinal or panel methods. Because of the 
small sample sizes in 1984 and 1996, all three datasets were combined into one. I use 
multinomial logistic regression to uncover any determinants of Black voter turnout. 
3.1 Variables 
 The primary dependent variable for Chapter 4.1 is voter turnout: if the respondent 
voted in the election of that survey year. Independent variables include political-based 
variables: self-identified party affiliation and political opinions on abortion, government 
spending on defense and services, and a question on the rights of gays and lesbians to 
serve in the military. Control variables include demographics: gender, age, education 
level, family income, and census region. Descriptive statistics and the distribution of 
these variables can be found in Table 3.1.  
 Black Republicans, Independents, and other non-Democrat parties were collapsed 
into one group, non-Democrats, because Republicans’ relatively small numbers made 
Republican vs. Democrat comparisons both problematic and neglectful of the significant 
number of self-identified Black Independents (see Tables 1.1 and 3.2). 
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 Other variables called for recoding as well. Preliminary analyses of the Black age 
distribution and voting revealed M-shaped and irregular curves. For example, in 1984, 
voter turnout was low among young Black voters, high among those in their late 20s to 
Table 3.1: Demographic Descriptive Statistics (%) for Black Respondents in ANES 
1984, 1996, 2008 
 1984 1996 2008 Combined 
Age     
Mean  41.7 44.7 46.3 44.9 
18-30 38.4 18.4 20.1 24.1 
31-45 24.4 43.0 28.1 30.2 
46-60 16.0 17.9 32.2 25.5 
61+ 21.2 20.8 19.6 20.2 
Sex     
Female 65.6 61.8 59.2 61.3 
Male 34.4 38.2 40.8 38.8 
Region     
South 60.0 62.3 59.7 60.3 
Northeast 13.6 19.8 10.5 13.1 
North-Central 17.6 10.1 21.8 18.5 
West 8.8 7.7 8.1 8.2 
Income Tertile      
Bottom $0-16,125 $0-16,542 $0-24,331 - 
Middle $16,126-46,078 $16,543-45,118 $24,332-55,299 - 
Top $46,079+ $45,119+ $55,300+ - 
Median income 
range 
$25,344-27,646 $22,560-25,566 $33,180-38,709 - 
Education Level     
< Diploma 34.3 23.7 19.3 23.7 
H.S. diploma 35.1 35.3 38.0 36.7 
Some college 20.2 19.3 20.0 19.9 
Comm. college or 
A.A. 
2.0 11.1 10.2 8.4 
B.A. or higher 8.4 10.6 12.5 11.3 
 
late 30s, low again for middle-aged Blacks, high again for Blacks in their late 50s to late 
60s, and low again for the oldest in the population. For this reason, I created five age 
groups using the oldest voters as the comparison groups. It should also be noted that the 
age distribution within and between each survey were unequal. Family income, my proxy 
for socioeconomics, is coded by ANES in monetary brackets, but the category sizes vary 
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within each survey (i.e. $1000, $2500, and $10,000 ranges), and category levels vary 
between surveys (i.e. $14,000-15,000 versus $14,000-16,500). Because of categorical 
differences and the fact that Blacks have lower income levels (skewed even further right) 
Table 2.2: Political Descriptive Statistics (%) for Black Respondents in ANES 1984, 
1996, 2008 
 1984 1996 2008 Combined 
Sample (N) % 24.0 19.9 56.1 100.0 
Party 
Identification 
    
Democrat 63.6 65.7 71.1 68.2 
Non-Democrat 36.7 34.3 28.9 31.8 
Voted % by Party     
Democrat 76.9 75.2 88.9 83.8 
Non-Democrat 46.3 53.4 64.6 57.2 
Abortion Stance     
Never permitted 19.5 17.0 14.3 16.8 
Only in rape/incest 31.8 27.0 29.4 29.5 
Some restriction 13.6 16.5 12.2 13.8 
Woman’s choice 35.1 39.5 44.1 39.9 
Defense Spending     
Increase 33.1 36.2 26.7 30.2 
Keep the same 20.9 25.5 35.3 29.3 
Decrease 46.0 38.3 38.0 40.5 
Services Spending     
Increase 62.4 58.9 58.9 60.0 
Keep the same 24.7 27.2 29.3 27.3 
Decrease 12.9 13.9 11.8 12.7 
 
than Whites, creating traditional ordinal income categories—low, middle, and high—
proved difficult. Therefore, income was divided into thirds or tertiles: the bottom 33%, 
the middle third, and the top 33%. Although not perfect, this approach to income was also 
the most useful when combining datasets. Each category was presented in 2012 dollars, 
rounded to the nearest dollar (Manuel 2013). 
 The education variable is presented categorically, because not all surveys directly 
asked the number of years of education. The category named “some college” means the 
respondent attended college but subsequently did not or have not yet obtained a degree. 
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The ANES categories of “Bachelor’s degree” and “advanced (graduate) degree” were 
consolidated. Education for all Americans, especially Blacks, is skewed right, so the 
number of respondents who filled these latter categories was small. Views on abortion 
included four categories in each survey: “never permitted,” “only in the case of rape or 
incest,” “some restrictions,” and “always a woman’s choice”. The “some restrictions” 
category meant something other than restricting abortion to rape or incest cases. Perhaps 
such a restriction could be by gestation period, legality of the mother’s decision (rights of 
the father or parents), or life of the mother, but none of the ANES surveys specify. The 
original scale questions concerning preference on what the government should do about 
defense and services spending had seven points including 1) increase spending, 4) keep 
spending the same, and 7) decrease spending. I condensed the scale into three 
categories—1-3 increase spending, 4 keep spending at the same levels, 5-7 decrease 
spending—based on the distribution of the responses. Also, a year variable was added 
with 2008 as the reference group to note any significant turnout differences as cohort 
effects. 
 The models for Chapter 4.1 were set up according to variable types. Model 1 
features demographic control variables. Model 2 features the political-based variables: 
stances on abortion, positions on government spending, and election year. The final 
model in Chapter 4.1, Model 3, only adds my primary independent variable of interest, 
political party affiliation. Again, this variable is divided into Democrat/non-Democrat 
comparison. It is included in Model 3 to assess how much party affiliation contributes to 
variance in Black voter turnout. 
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 The statistical method used in Chapter 4.1 is multinomial logistic regression, but a 
few points need to be noted here. First, although not represented in the regression tables, 
indicator variables for missing responses were included in the models to avoid losing 
responses, because the Black samples in 1984 and 1996 were relatively small. 
Additionally, the reference categories for the political opinion variables are not the 
standardized center or neutral response; rather, the reference groups here are the 
traditional Democratic/liberal positions on the particular question. This was implemented 
to reveal a far more meaningful result. For example, the difference between the likelihood 
of those who favor more or less government defense spending versus those who want to 
keep it at current levels may not be as telling when comparing those who favor increases 
versus those who favor decreases in defense spending or want spending levels kept the 
same. Additionally, the traditional Democratic response, in this example decrease defense 
spending, is less subjective than “keep spending the same” response. The latter response 
may mean very different things in each time period. 
 The statistical method used in the Chapter 4.2 study is also multinomial logistic 
regression, but it also includes the separate analysis of ANES 2008. This election was 
singled out for partisanship factors, because it contained an oversample of Black 
respondents and variables not present in other elections that may have impacted 
partisanship: positions on gays and lesbians serving in the military and stances on same-
sex marriage. The primary dependent variable for Chapter 4.2 is Democratic Party 
identification: if the respondent identified as a Democrat or not in the election of that 
survey year. Again, control variables include demographics: gender, age, education level, 
family income, and census region. Descriptive statistics and the distribution of these 
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variables can also be found in Table 3.1. Similar to Chapter 4.1, political-based variables 
include political opinions on abortion, government spending on defense and services, and 
for 2008, the questions on gay rights in the military and same-sex marriage.  
 The military issue (which also appeared in 1996) was selected, because 2008 was 
a period when “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” was being questioned. It was coded as “strongly 
allow,” “allow,” “not allow,” and “strongly not allow.” The issue of gay marriage was 
included in the 2008 analyses, because of Black’s controversial position: mostly 
identifying as Democrats—the liberal party that supports same-sex marriage—but 
typically not in favor of same-sex marriage. The opinions on marriage in ANES 2008 
were: “should be allowed to marry,” “should not be allowed to marry,” and “should not 
be allowed but should be able to have the same legal rights” or statuses commonly 
referred to as “civil unions.” Liberal/conservative ideology was omitted despite its strong 
attachment to American partisanship and regionalism. Because of the full scope of 
meanings that different terms like “liberal,” “moderate,” and “conservative” held at 
different periods in American political history and especially because these datasets are 
combined, the substantive use of this variable was impractical. The political opinion 
questions serve as a form of proxy for ideology. 
 As in Chapter 4.1, the models for this study were set up according to variable 
types. Chapter 4.2 Model 1 features demographic variables, the variables used as 
controls. Model 2 features the political-based variables. There was no Model 3 in this part 
of Chapter 4. If there is no strong association between ideology and partisanship among 
Blacks, then it would suggest that Black partisanship is governed by entirely different 
forces than what is commonly asserted.  
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Chapter 4:  
Results 
 
4.1 Predictors of Black Voter Turnout 
 Chapter 4.1 analyses examine how demographic factors, political ideology, and 
party affiliation influence voter turnout. Stereotypically, it is thought that all Blacks vote 
the same. While not measuring how they vote, these analyses will tell the story of who 
votes. If it is discovered that there are differences between Blacks who vote and those 
who do not, then the assumption of Black America’s politics—all Blacks vote the same—
would be replaced with issues of Black voter dynamics; it matters which Blacks are 
voting. Results are presented in Table 4.1. 
 Age predicted Black voter turnout as the oldest Blacks were more likely to vote 
than younger groups, a patterning consistent with the literature on Americans in general. 
Although all brackets of Blacks were less likely to vote than the oldest Blacks, the 
youngest group was the most significantly and substantially less likely to vote. 
Interestingly, the second oldest (46-60) Black group was next least likely to vote. These 
results are not entirely consistent with conventional wisdom that voter turnout directly 
increases with age. Turnout was the highest among the oldest Blacks, but the non-linear 
results could indicate possible generational trends in Black political participation. 
Comparing preliminary individual election analyses did not show strong generational 
trends. Incidentally, the election years are spaced apart so that an individual in an age 
group in one election would be part of an older age group in another, creating pseudo-
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measure of generation. While the influence of age was not perfectly linear in any 
election, the variability was not consistent between elections to clearly point to 
generational patterns rather than age groups interacting with specific elections. 
Table 3.1: Exponentiated Logistic Regression Coefficients for Predicting Voter Turnout 
among Blacks in 1984, 1996, and 2008 (N= 902) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Woman 1.122 1.252 1.204 
Age    
18-30 .202*** .179*** .261*** 
31-45 .495** .450** .557* 
46-60 .502† .372*** .419** 
Education Level    
< Diploma .520** .582** .682† 
Some college 1.384 1.352 1.414 
Comm. college/A.A. 2.003† 1.877† 1.937† 
B.A. or higher 3.266** 2.874** 3.313** 
Income Tertile    
Bottom .615* .638† .656 
Top .916 1.047 1.021 
Region    
Northeast 1.176 1.290 1.335 
North-Central 1.639* 1.351 1.381 
West .962 .863 .978 
Abortion Stance    
Never permitted  .401** .483* 
Only in rape/incest  1.114 1.360 
Some restriction  1.010 1.262 
Defense Spending    
Increase  1.131 1.136 
Keep the same  .745 .799 
Services Spending    
Keep the same  .849 .921 
Decrease  1.154 1.296 
Year    
1984  .448** .461** 
1996  .371** .389** 
Democrat   3.212*** 
Pseudo-R² .149 .213 .270 
Constant 1.975*** 2.760*** 1.499** 
† = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001 
 All age categories of Blacks experienced a drop in odds ratios and increase in p-
value in Model 2, suggesting that the political opinions of the oldest Blacks (61 and 
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older) were less diverse than those of younger age groups. Voter turnout for the younger 
groups may have been linked to certain political stances or perhaps if they took a stance 
at all. This trend was most notably among Blacks ages 46 to 60 who moved from .502 to 
.372 and strongly increased in significance. Once party was added in Model 3, the odds 
ratios for age increased; and each group, except for the youngest, shed strength in p-
value. What appeared to be purely political in Model 2 was mostly revealed to be the 
impact of partisanship in Model 3. Overall, the results show that age was the strongest 
demographic predictor of Black voter turnout, and the oldest Black voters (61 and over) 
were the most reliable to turnout, a pattern similar to Americans in general.  
 Neither gender nor region yielded any significant results. The analyses suggest 
that Black women were more likely to vote than Black men, but again, this pattern lacks 
strong p-values. The lack of statistically significant difference between the odds ration 
turnout of Black men and Black women counters the political literature that says that 
women are more reliable voters than men. The findings for region were not surprising as 
neither scholars nor pundits linked census region to political participation as much as 
political behavior. There was some significance of Blacks voting more in the North-
Central United States (Midwest) than in the South in Model 1, but this difference was 
explained away by political variables in subsequent models. 
 Education revealed another pattern shared with previous studies. All models point 
to a positive relationship with voter turnout. Blacks with no high school diploma were 
significantly less likely to vote than Blacks who only graduated high school. The 
significance level drops in each model, meaning that this trend was weakened in the face 
of personal politics and partisanship. There was no strong statistical advantage for turnout 
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between Blacks who attended some college and those who discontinued education after 
high school. Specific election-based results, albeit small samples, reveal that this group’s 
turnout varied by age composition. For example, in 1984, “some college” Blacks mostly 
consisted of younger respondents who probably had yet to complete college rather than 
simply dropped out, therefore voted more than Blacks with an associate’s degree or 
equivalent. Blacks with four-year degrees or greater were over three times the as likely to 
vote as Blacks with only a high school diploma. It held a constant and strong significance 
in all models. A college education had the most powerful educational impact for Black 
voter turnout. 
 Blacks in the lowest income tertile were substantially less likely to vote than 
Blacks in the middle bracket by a factor of .656 in Model 3. Such a pattern is reflected in 
previous studies; however, there are a couple of caveats. Notice here the loss in 
significance among the lowest tertile when political variables were added in Model 2 and 
partisanship in Model 3. This suggests that differences in poll attendance between the 
middle and lower income Blacks could be partially explained by differences in political 
opinions such as abortion: low income tertile Blacks are generally less likely to vote than 
those in the middle, but the odds of voting for the former group increase if they share the 
same political views as the latter. Election-specific analyses hint that Black income 
patterns trend toward the larger prescribed American income-voting positive relationship. 
For example, in 2008, Blacks in the bottom third bracket had slightly lower odds of 
voting than middle tertile Blacks in all models. On the other hand, Blacks in the top 
income tertile were far more likely to vote than middle third Blacks. Again, 2008 
involved a small sample of N=583. Overall, the statistical and substantive findings are 
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counter to the literature and media reports that assert income has a positive relationship 
with voter turnout.  
 Models 2 and 3 include political opinions. Although few were statistically 
significant, a story was still told. First, these variables explained half as much variance in 
Black voter turnout as the demographic variables, increasing Pseudo-R² from .149 in 
Model 1 to .213 in Model 2. Abortion held the most significant result. Blacks who oppose 
abortion in all circumstances were far less likely to vote than pro-choice Blacks in Model 
2 and Model 3. Interestingly, however, Blacks who favored restrictions were more likely 
to vote than pro-choice Blacks, especially those who wanted some restriction different 
from just rape and incest. These findings suggest that although Blacks were motivated to 
vote by party (discussed below), they turned out to vote based on the issue and not total 
partisan alignment. Otherwise, we would have witnessed all of these stances having a 
lower likelihood of voting when compared to pro-choice Blacks, the position commonly 
associated with Democrats.   
 Although non-significant, Blacks who were satisfied with both social services and 
defense spending had lower odds ratios of voting than the respective Democratic 
positions (more spending on services, less on defense), and holding conservative 
spending positions meant greater likelihood of voting. Closer analyses show that the 
impact of spending position on voting varies by election, suggesting less of an ideological 
trend and instead specific socio-political context reactions. Not surprisingly, Blacks in 
2008 were more likely to vote than Blacks in 1984 and especially 1996. These results do 
not suggest any particular predictor of Black voter turnout, but the variable does reflect 
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the trends in Black voter turnout through modern elections. SSDAN (2012) shows that 
1996 witnessed one of the lowest Black turnouts since the Civil Rights Movement.  
 What is missing from the literature on voter turnout is the possible role party 
identification has as an independent variable. Again, all of the demographic variables 
account for just about 15% of the variation in Black voter turnout, and political opinions 
added just fewer than 7%. Here, partisanship added a healthy 6% on its own, bringing 
Model 3 to a solid .270 Pseudo-R².  
 The partisanship variable indicated that Black Democrats had a 3.212 odds ratio 
of voting from 1984 to 2008. Individual analysis of each year indicates that Black 
Democrats had stronger turnout odds ratios even in 2008 that had unprecedented Black 
turnout in general. The partisanship effect was the weakest (but still statistically and 
substantially strong by itself) in 1996, the election with the lowest Black turnout 
according to SSDAN (2012). If Black Democrats vote more than Black non-Democrats 
as Figure 2.1 and Tables 1.1, 2.2 and 2.3 suggest, then it seems that declines in voting 
among Black Democrats (the reliable voters) contributed to the 1996 drop in turnout 
which, in turn, may explain the smaller party affiliation effects on voter turnout in 1996 
when compared to 1984 and subsequently 2008. 
4.2 Determinants of Black Democratic Affiliation  
 Chapter 4.2 of this study examines demographic and ideological effects on party 
affiliation. The popular notion is that Blacks have the same politics and Democratic Party 
alignment—the “Black vote”—with the underlying assumption that Black politics are a 
product of race, simply being Black. If true, analysis should reveal little in terms of 
independent demographic and political variables. If Black attachment to the Democratic  
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Table 4.2: Exponentiated Logistic Regression Coefficients for Predicting Democratic 
Party Affiliation among Blacks in 1984, 1996, and 2008 (N= 1029) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Woman 1.456** 1.556** 
Age   
18-30 .253*** .226*** 
31-45 .469** .438*** 
46-60 .640† .567* 
Education Level   
< Diploma .594** .621* 
Some college .985 .909 
Comm. college/A.A. .932 .812 
B.A. or higher .905 .728 
Income Tertile   
Bottom .612* .629* 
Top 1.095 1.116 
Region   
Northeast .955 .960 
North-Central 1.067 .977 
West .732 .654 
Abortion Stance   
Never permitted  .397*** 
Only in rape/incest  .699† 
Some restriction  .582* 
Defense Spending   
Increase  1.138 
Keep the same  .764 
Services Spending   
Keep the same  .741 
Decrease  .763 
Year   
1984  .650† 
1996  .587* 
Pseudo-R² .090 .126 
Constant 1.558*** 2.697*** 
† = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001  
Party is purely racial and/or cultural and extends beyond any other factor, then one would 
expect to find little association between variables such as age, education, and government 
spending stances, and the models would not explain very much variance; Blacks would 
self-identify as Democrats regardless of demographics or political stances. Results are 
presented in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. 
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 Black women in were more likely to identify as Democrats than Black men, 
significant at p < .01 in both models. This supports past studies that being Black and a 
woman leads to a more liberal stance which may be manifesting itself via Democratic 
Party alignment. 
 Age and Democratic Party affiliation once again demonstrated a strong, positive 
relationship as odds ratios for being Democrat decreased for each younger age category 
when compared to the oldest group of Blacks. The findings for all groups were highly 
significant. Although Black voter turnout increased in 2008 and support for Democrat 
candidate Obama was phenomenal, Black Democratic affiliation was still a factor of age. 
Rather than interpreting the findings in the direction of younger Blacks not being 
involved much with the Democratic Party, further examination indicates that the story is 
perhaps on the other end: nearly all of Blacks ages 61 and over identified as Democrats in 
2008. 
 Education tells an unusual story for Black Democratic Party affiliation. Blacks 
without a high school diploma were less likely to be Democrat than Blacks with only a 
diploma. What is notable here is the lack of significant findings. Typically, it is thought 
that education produces more informed and/or liberal (Democratic) Americans, but here, 
the effect of education on Black partisanship was simply contingent on having a high 
school diploma or not. And based on the results for the least educated Blacks, one cannot 
argue that being Democrat was the stereotypical, default Black partisan position, an 
identity that is an assumed product of race and can be transcended through education and 
political awareness. 
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 Family income level findings among Blacks counter any previous defined 
patterns. Although there are several factors that impact Democratic identification, 
typically greater income means greater support for conservative, usually non-Democrat-
associated policies that protect the finances of those well off.  Here in both models, 
Blacks in the lower income third were less likely to be Democrats than middle tertile 
Blacks, and top income Blacks displayed no statistical difference with those in the 
middle. This pattern echoes the pattern found with the education variable, if we assume 
education and income have a direct positive relationship. The lack of strong directional 
findings with family income level and partisanship could also be attributed to a 
combination of lesser diversity of Black family incomes when compared to Whites as 
well as the 1984 and 1996 economies where high-pay/low-skill jobs such as industrial 
work (that many Blacks occupied) were still a reality. In other words, Blacks who had 
only a diploma could fit into the middle or top income tertile along sided college-
educated Blacks, diversifying these income categories to not reflect any directional trend. 
 Based on the layout of the American Electoral College (red states and blue states) 
and the reliability many hold in presidential elections, the result for region and Black 
partisanship are somewhat surprising. Region did not manifest as a predictor of Black 
partisanship. For instance, the western United States has the reputation of being reliably 
Democrat (blue states) while the South is largely Republican. Large opposition to racial 
and social issues in the South on the part of Republicans in statewide and local districts 
may have galvanized Black support for the Democratic Party. Juxtaposing the strength of 
that these regionalisms have on Blacks yielded no consistent results. Preliminary 
investigations suggest that small regional effects existed in specific elections but vary in 
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direction and reason (i.e. possibly by states with open and closed primaries in 2008), 
becoming lost in the ANES combined data. So, region does not contribute to 
understanding Black partisanship as a whole. 
 Political opinions yielded interesting results in Model 2. Abortion stance results 
were somewhat consistent with what one would expect to find based on popular party 
platforms. Blacks who did not support the full pro-choice position had lesser odds ratios 
for being Democrats as those who did, especially among the most pro-life Blacks. By a 
factor of .397, Blacks who would never support abortion under any circumstance were 
the least likely to be Democrats when compared to those who supported a woman’s right 
to choose. This was the statistically strongest factor of all the political variables. Blacks 
favoring at least some restrictions on abortion reported less than 60% of a chance 
identifying as Democrat as pro-choice (woman’s choice) Blacks at the p < .05 level. 
Similarly, Blacks wanting abortions restricted to cases of rape and incest had lower odds 
ratios for being Democrats, but they were actually next likely to identify as Democrats 
after pro-choice Blacks.  
 On the other hand, political ideology on defense and social spending had no 
significant effect on Black party affiliation. Additionally, Model 1 has a Pseudo-R² of 
.090, suggesting that demographics accounting just 9% of the variance in Black 
partisanship. Political opinions add another 3.6%. Together, these facts and a mild 
Pseudo-R² of .126 in Model 2 tell a strong story for Black partisanship: it is largely based 
on something other than conventional measures. Conventional wisdom tells that 
Democrats are associated with the political left. These proxy measures for ideology—the 
often-assumed basis of American partisanship—unsuccessfully produced any stereotyped 
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results. Subsequent individual results did show that larger (although still mild) Pseudo-R² 
were revealed in 1984 and 1996, but 2008 reported a sharp decline in what the same 
variables accounted for. Unlike the previous years, the results indicated something unique 
happened in 2008. Whatever contributed to this outcome may also be responsible for both 
the increased Black turnout and increased Democratic Party affiliation in 2008, perhaps 
an Obama effect. 
 Finally, Model 2 indicated Democratic attachment among Blacks varied by 
election year. Not surprisingly, Blacks in the unprecedented election of 2008 were more 
likely to be Democrats than Blacks in 1984 and even more so than in 1996. This is 
consistent with SSDAN (2012) who contend that Black voter turnout in 1996 was the 
lowest in modern elections. If Black Democrats vote more than non-Democrats as the 
analyses in the previous section suggest, then it makes sense that low voter turnout was 
due to lower Black Democratic identification in 1996. 
 Table 4.3 mostly mirrored the results found in Table 4.2, but there were some 
notable shifts. The 2008 results show that in this more recent election, the difference in 
Democratic Party identification between Black men and Black women disappeared. The 
lack of statistical significance for gender found in ANES 2008 data may be a product of 
the unique 2008 election. If Blacks were motivated to vote in 2008 because of Barack 
Obama, many may have begun voting in the Democratic Primary to nominate him as 
candidate of the party, a task that would have meant more registered Black Democrats 
especially in states with closed primaries. Since Black women were more likely to be 
Democrats than Black men in previous times, this increase in registered Democrats in 
2008 would mostly have to have come from Black men. 
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Table 4.3: Exponentiated Logistic Regression Coefficients for Predicting Democratic 
Affiliation among Blacks in 2008 (N= 575) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Woman  1.245  1.322 
Age Category   
18-30 .207*** .174*** 
31-45 .277*** .246*** 
46-60 .360** .318** 
Education Level   
< Diploma .415** .421** 
Some college 1.029 1.012 
Comm. college/A.A. .717 .664 
B.A. or higher 1.117 .999 
Income Tertile   
Bottom .628 .614 
Top .825 .876 
Region   
Northeast .837 .844 
North-Central 1.373 1.289 
West .736 .686 
Abortion Stance   
Never permitted  .346* 
Only in rape/incest  .777 
Some restriction  .637 
Defense Spending   
Increase  1.031 
Keep the same  .995 
Services Spending   
Keep the same  .986 
Decrease  .690 
Gays in Military   
Strongly allow  .758 
Not allow  .646 
Strongly not allow  .897 
Gay Marriage   
Civil Unions  1.097 
Not Allow  .925 
Pseudo-R² .103 .131 
Constant 2.339*** 3.622*** 
† = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001 
 The findings for age and education in 2008 were about the same as the combined 
data, but the coefficients were a bit more extreme: younger Blacks and Blacks without a 
diploma were even more likely to be non-Democrats in 2008. Family income ceased to 
be a predictor of Black Democratic affiliation in 2008, probably for the same rationale as 
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the decline in gender significance. Since Democratic Party affiliation increased in 2008 in 
general, new Black Democrats probably came from groups typically less likely to be 
Democrats such as low-income Blacks. As far as abortion stance, only those who agreed 
that abortions should never be permitted were statistically less likely to be Democrats, but 
this was significant at the p < .05 level versus the p < .001 in the combined data (1984 
and 1996). 
 What is interesting is how neither positions on gays serving in the military nor 
same-sex marriage served as predictors of Black partisanship. Again, Blacks typically 
have been slow to back such stances that the Democratic Party has championed, yet these 
issues had no effect on Black partisanship. 
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Chapter 5:  
Conclusion 
 
 The conventional political wisdom behind the notion of, “All Blacks vote the 
same,” assumes the political expression of Blacks and subtly their propensity to vote with 
turnout being only a product of race. This study investigated both voter turnout (political 
participation) and party preference (political behavior) of Black Americans of the Reagan 
Era to the election of the first Black president. Prior to this work, the relationship of party 
and voter turnout have been largely neglected or simply assumed to be non-existent, and 
this relationship had not been explored among specific voting blocs such as Blacks. The 
purpose of this research was to evaluate the accuracy of the political stereotype placed on 
Blacks as voters and to gain a greater understanding of Black voter turnout and the 
partisanship of Blacks, tasks that subsequently rendered promising and enlightening 
insight into Black politics. The conclusions of this study were located in what the 
analyses found as well as what it did not. 
 Chapter 4.1 uncovered factors that impacted Black voter turnout. The strongest of 
these predictors were age, abortion stance, and party identification. Age had a strong 
positive relationship with Black political participation; the older the person, the more 
likely he or she will vote. In this respect, Blacks share broader American voting trends 
(Gimpel et al 2004; Burr et al 2002). No support was found to detail any consistent 
generational patterns, meaning any age differences in voting within a given year were 
most likely due to the sociopolitical environment at that time. 
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 Even though other measures were not as consistently strong statistically, they still 
told an interesting story. Because no results suggested Black women vote more than 
Black men, it suggested that gendered political differences between Blacks are minor 
when compared to Whites (Fisher 2011; Hardy-Fanta et al 2006; Lien 1998). The positive 
impact of education on Blacks going to the polls was only contingent on graduating high 
school, somewhat mirroring the rest of America (Straughn and Androit 2011; 
Sondheimer and Green 2010; Burden 2009). Low-income Blacks were less likely to vote 
than others, and there was no notable difference in turnout odds between middle- and 
high-income Blacks. This was probably a reflection of Blacks’ lower median income than 
Whites, diversity of income brackets by education, and the past presence of high-
pay/low-skill jobs Blacks occupied. With the exception of abortion, neither region nor 
political opinions proved reliable predictors of Black voter turnout. The most 
conservative pro-life Blacks were always less likely to vote than those who supported a 
woman’s unhindered right to choose. 
 The most prominent story in Chapter 4.1 was the role party identification plays in 
Black voter turnout. With the exception of midterm elections, the role of partisanship in 
political participation in national elections, minority-centered or otherwise, remains either 
assumed or not assessed. Here, I found that Black Democrats were more likely to vote 
than Black non-Democrats by a ratio factor of over three. Partisanship alone greatly 
contributed to explaining Black voter turnout variance. If political stances drove Black 
partisanship as it is assumed to for Americans in general, one would expect Black 
political opinions to echo the turnout coefficients found for being Democrat, almost as if 
one were measuring the same variables. For example, if Black Democrats were more 
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likely to vote more than non-Democrats and all took the Democratic stance of defense 
cuts when it came to defense spending, the results should show that Blacks who are pro-
cuts vote more than those adhering to pro-military spending ideology. Since the outcomes 
here do not exactly show this, it justified the focus of Chapter 4.2. 
 What motivates Black Americans to vote is somewhat different from the rest of 
America. Blacks strongly follow national trends on age and somewhat on education and 
income, but partisanship is the most interesting finding. Because Democratic affiliation 
matters in Black voter turnout which usually backs Democrats, simply holding that 
Blacks vote for Democrats as a product of being Black is called into question. Black 
turnout is not just a factor of disenfranchisement or cross-the-board race-based political 
solidarity. In other words, rather than the notion of “Blacks vote Democrat,” it may be 
more accurately stated that “Black Democrats vote (Democrat).” This finding 
necessitated an exploration into what makes a Black Democrat. 
 The strongest and most stable determinants of Black Democratic affiliation 
proved to be gender, age, and abortion stance. Black women were more likely to be 
Democrats than Black men, a finding that agrees with the intersectional literature 
(Allison 2011; Kam et al 2007; Philpot and Walton 2007). This was true until 2008, were 
Black men mostly comprised the new wave of Black Democrats. Unlike the general 
American trend of older voters being more conservative and Republican (Lau and 
Redlawsk 2008), the outcome was reversed for Black Americans. These findings partly 
confirm the conclusions of Luks and Elms (2005) who stated that young and the oldest 
Blacks are less attached to the Democratic Party. What was also interesting here is that 
the youngest Black Americans were still the least likely to be Democrats when compared 
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to the oldest in 2008; Blacks have been one of the strongest and consistent supporters of 
the Democratic Party, and this was the election that supposedly inspired new, younger 
voters. It is interesting that young Blacks were still less likely to be Democrats. It raises 
the question of what will the future hold for the Democratic Party. 
 Of all the political variables, abortion was the strongest factor for Black 
partisanship; Blacks holding conservative views on abortion were far less likely to be 
Democrat that Blacks in favor of a woman’s right to choose. Abortion remained 
significant when individual elections were investigated in additional research, particularly 
in 2008 as presented in Chapter 4.2. Gays serving in the military and the hot-button issue 
of gay marriage were examined. Blacks largely did not support same-sex marriage 
despite Democrats being the liberal party that does. Many pundits went as far as to blame 
large voter turnout of Blacks for the passage of bans on same-sex in both California and 
Florida, although scholars have shown these measures would have passed without 
increased Black turnout (Abrajano 2010; Slade and Smith 2010). Sherkat, de Vries, and 
Creek (2010) attribute anti-same-sex marriage attitudes to Blacks’ strong ties to 
Protestant religion. The interesting tale here was that opinions on gay marriage did not 
impact partisanship. Positions on gay marriage (and homosexuality in general) and 
abortion are thought to be strongly impacted by religious views, and Black support for 
several issues hinges on how it lines up with their religion. It is curious that abortion 
stances were strong predictors of Black partisanship in 1984, 1996, and 2008 individually 
and collectively, but gay marriage—largely opposed by Blacks because of religion—was 
not. 
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 Black Americans typically counter common political knowledge of partisanship 
in other areas. The likelihood of Democratic partisanship increased for Blacks with a high 
school diploma or more. Unlike Americans as a whole who become more conservative 
and Republican as income increases (Rehm 2010; Brewer and Stonecash 2001; Brooks 
and Brady 1999), low-income Blacks were less likely to identify as Democrat, a finding 
that supports Luks and Elms (2005). But counter to Luks and Elms (2005) who find that 
Blacks in the South are less Democratic than Blacks in other regions, this analysis did not 
detect any consistent regional patterns.  
 The story within Black partisanship was told by the role of ideology, represented 
here by abortion and opinions on government spending. Although abortion presented 
strong, typical results, positions on spending were not dependable factors in Black 
partisanship. These measures added little in terms of explaining Black partisanship. 
Ideology and partisanship in America are so frequently and interchangeably paired, 
making this finding very valuable. Although it does not have to be reflected by individual 
issues, ideology is the assumed basis of political opinions and partisanship. If these 
variables were minimal in variance explanation and not significant, then what does it 
mean for Black partisanship? The popular notion is that Blacks have the same politics 
and Democratic Party alignment—the “Black vote”—with the underlying assumption 
that Black politics are a product of race: simply being Black and/or more recently, an 
Obama effect. Understand that this research does not have the capacity or data to directly 
confirm this undoubtedly, but if it were true, analyses should reveal little in terms of 
independent demographic and political variables. For the most part, the outcomes do 
show that Blacks largely self-identify as Democrats regardless of most political stances 
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and ideology. In other words, while it cannot be said that Blacks are Democrats because 
they are Black, one can say that something other than ideological and demographic 
differences are driving Black partisanship. 
 In summary, this study addresses Black political stereotypes in three ways. First, 
descriptive statistics revealed that not all Blacks are Democrats; few are Republicans, but 
a significant number are Independents. Second, Black Democrats vote more often than 
Black non-Democrats, and voting is also a factor of age and abortion stance. Finally, 
although Black partisanship is sculpted by age, gender, and abortion, Black partisanship 
does not appear to be cleanly ideological.  
 There are several practical applications of this research. Politically speaking, the 
combination of these facts meant that perhaps Republicans had opportunities, especially 
in the decades prior to the 2008 Presidential Election, to recruit a significant amount of 
Black support and appeal and motivate to them to vote. For example, low-income, young, 
Black men who do not support abortion were more likely to be divorced from the 
political system: less likely to vote and be attached to a political party. Republicans had 
the opportunity to appeal to such Americans similar to the manner they appeal to low-
income Whites who support them despite income trends and economic policy 
disadvantages. Further analyses indicate high turnout and Democratic Party identification 
that is not dependent on ideology make it very difficult for Republicans to sway Blacks. 
But again, this is a very recent development. 
 Furthermore, Meredith (2009) and Gerber, Green, and Shachar (2003) find that 
voting is habit-forming; past voting has an even greater effect on political participation 
than age and education (Gerber et al 2003), meaning that the increase in Black voters 
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witnessed in 2008 will likely endure for at least a few generations as evidenced by 
historically high Black turnout in the 2012 Presidential Election. This standing pool of 
potential anti-Democrat Black voters could have already been solidified behind the 
Republican Party if Republicans would have garnered their appeal and support. But other 
racial groups are not as politically “unsalvageable.” Latinos have recently reached voting 
and partisanship levels that Blacks occupied in elections prior to 2008 (Lopez and Taylor 
2012). Even if the solidification of Blacks in the Democratic Party is due to descriptive 
representation in 2008 and 2012, it is not far-fetched that a Latino presidential candidate 
could emerge over the next few decades and complete the process for Latinos as Obama 
did for Blacks. Further research should determine if Black political thought and 
progression described here is unique to Blacks or if Blacks are just at the forefront to 
minority voting patterns and development that may later be adopted by Latinos. 
 This study has some limitations. The first and most obvious of which is sample 
size. Because of the size of the Black population in general, datasets like the ANES with 
sample sizes of around 1200 are not the best for minority groups, making individual 
election evaluation results less generalizable. Surveys with larger Black samples like the 
National Black Election Studies (NBES) were considered, but no survey existed for 2008, 
and the issue of question consistency arose when ANES 2008 was to be used in place of a 
2008 NBES. Another limitation is the strength of the models. With low pseudo- R²’s in 
each Table, the models only accounted for some factors that determine Black political 
participation and Black partisanship; however, the full profile of variables was neither 
practical nor was it the goal.  
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 Future directions of this research should investigate predictors of party affiliation 
and political participation among other racial groups, especially Latinos. Also, the 
research conducted here only examined presidential elections. Would my findings hold 
true in midterm, local, and state-level elections? Additionally, more theories are needed 
concerning the findings of this study and other reported relationships in Black political 
thought, behavior, and participation. For instance, are non-Democrat non-voters a 
separated community from voting Black Democrats if community is defined in political 
expression?  
 The seemingly faith-based contradiction among Blacks is worth investigating 
extensively; abortion was a predictor of Black partisanship (and voter turnout) in each 
year, while same-sex marriage positions in 2008 were not. Historically, the Black church 
has been at the forefront of political engagement, the locus of planning during the Civil 
Rights Movement, and the refuge and forum of social ills. What contemporary role does 
religion and church attendance play in Black voting habits and party identification? 
Church attendance was included in preliminary research here but was subsequently 
dropped because of its interaction with abortion and the nature of the variable: behavioral 
rather than demographic or political opinion. Further research should measure the 
influence of behavioral and identity variables like church attendance and denomination. 
 Finally, the results of this study warrant future investigation into what makes a 
Black partisan or non-partisan. Questions should address the role of candidates and 
elections. Do Black non-Democrats not vote and/or not identify with a party because of 
weak non-Democrat opposition candidates, satisfaction with strong Democratic 
candidates, or because they feel content with either candidate’s representation? And what 
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about the actual work of voting? Is Black voter turnout a matter of party outreach and 
get-out-the-vote campaigns as Philpot et al (2009) suggest, or do Black non-Democrats 
simply find politics and elections not worth the trouble? The political attitudes of young 
Blacks should be explored as well. Why is it that the youngest Black Americans were still 
the least likely to be Democrats in 2008 when Blacks have been one of the strongest and 
consistent supporters of the Democratic Party, and 2008 was the election that supposedly 
inspired new, younger voters? Such inquiries may venture beyond typical political and 
demographic data found in surveys and into areas of identity and Black conceptions of 
politics (qualitative analyses), because as the findings here suggest, political and 
demographic variables only account for a small portion of Democratic alignment, even in 
2008. 
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